Memorandum of Law

on the Interplay of the Federal and State Domestic Violence Firearm Laws

December 1, 2000

Jennifer DeCarli

INTRODUCTION

The New York State Commission on Domestic Violence Fatalities investigated and analyzed 57 domestic violence homicides that were committed in New York State from 1990 - 1997. In their Report to the Governor submitted in October 1997, the Report revealed that 50% of the cases involved the use of handguns or long guns. (1) National statistics further reveal the danger firearms pose for domestic violence victims. One study reported that more than four times as many women were murdered with a gun by their husbands or intimate acquaintances than were killed by strangers' guns, knives or other weapons combined. (2)

In order to better protect victims of domestic violence from such firearm danger, New York State provides specific laws addressing firearms and domestic violence in proceedings involving orders of protection. Further, there are specific federal firearm laws targeted at domestic violence offenders and individuals subject to court orders which should complement and act in tangent with the New York state laws.

As is often the case, when two different sets of laws apply to the same forum, confusion can result. Due to different definitions of firearms as well as different guidelines for when firearms should be taken away, the state and federal laws differ. This memorandum summarizes the state and federal laws, clarifies the differences between the state and federal laws, and argues that due to these differences, the state and federal laws can be contradictory and may generate confusion for advocates. As such, it is critical to be aware of these differences in order to effectively advocate for one's client.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

POINT ONE

The New York State laws on firearms provide courts with discretion regarding when to order firearm removal, suspension and/or revocation or ineligibility for licenses in proceedings involving temporary, dispositional and violations of orders of protection.

A. New York State Laws on Firearms and Domestic Violence

New York's laws addressing domestic violence and firearms are set forth in §842-a of the Family Court Act, §530.14 of the Criminal Procedure Law and as of September 20, 2000 §240(3) and §252 of the Domestic Relations Law. Each of these laws provide guidelines for judges regarding when firearms should be removed and licenses suspended and/or revoked or a respondent and/or defendant declared ineligible for a license in proceedings involving a request for an order of protection. These three statutes were recently modified to include provisions regarding prior convictions for stalking as a factor courts must consider when deciding whether or not firearms should be removed and licenses suspended and/or revoked.

New York's definition of firearms can be found in the Penal Law at §265.00(3). This definition includes any pistol or revolver; a shot gun having one or more barrels less than eighteen inches in length; a rifle having one or more barrels less than sixteen inches in length; or any weapon made from a shotgun or rifle whether by alteration, modification, or otherwise if such weapon as altered, modified or otherwise has an overall length of less than twenty-six inches. Importantly, New York's statutes addressing firearms and domestic violence specifically state that nothing prohibits the courts from expanding upon the type of firearms to be surrendered. (See FCA § 842-a(5)(c), CPL §530.14(5)(c)). Thus, the courts can go beyond the narrow definition of firearms contained in the New York Penal Law.

In sum, the statutes discussed below provide courts with some discretion regarding firearms and orders of protection. If certain requirements are met, the state courts must order the removal of firearms and suspension and/or revocation of licenses and/or declare the individual ineligible for firearm licenses. However, if the specific statutory requirements have not been met, the state courts have discretion regarding firearms. As will be discussed later, this discretion can conflict with the federal laws regarding firearms and orders of protection.

i. Family Court Act Provisions Regarding Firearms and Orders of Protection

Family Court Act § 842-a provides guidelines for when the Family Court may and/or must suspend and/or revoke firearm licenses, order the respondent ineligible for such a license and order the immediate surrender of firearms. These guidelines are further broken down depending on whether the proceeding involves a request for a temporary order of protection, for a dispositional order of protection or if the proceeding involves a finding of a willful violation of an order of protection.

According to § 842-a(1)(a) and (b), when issuing a temporary order of protection, the Family Court must suspend any licenses, order the Respondent ineligible for a license, and/or order the immediate surrender of any or all firearms owned or possessed if the court receives information giving it good cause to believe that:

• (i) the Respondent had a prior conviction of any violent felony offense or
• (ii) the Respondent had previously been found to have willfully failed to obey a prior order of protection and this failure involved the infliction of serious physical injury, the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon, behavior constituting any violent felony offense or
• (iii) if the Respondent has a prior conviction for stalking in the first, second, third or fourth degrees. (3) 

The Family Court may suspend any licenses, order the Respondent ineligible for a license, and/or order the immediate surrender of any or all firearms owned or possessed if it finds a substantial risk that the Respondent may use or threaten to use a firearm unlawfully against the family or household member protected by the current temporary order of protection.

According to FCA §842-a(2)(a) and (b), when issuing a dispositional order of protection, the Family Court must suspend any licenses, order the Respondent ineligible for a license, and/or order the immediate surrender of any or all firearms owned or possessed when the Family Court finds that the conduct which resulted in the issuance of the order of protection involved:

• (i) the infliction of serious physical injury
• (ii) the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument or
• (iii) behavior constituting any violent felony offense

Again, the Family Court may revoke and/or suspend any licenses, order the Respondent ineligible for a license, and/or order the immediate surrender of any or all firearms owned or possessed if it finds a substantial risk that the Respondent may use or threaten to use a firearm unlawfully against the family or household member protected by the current dispositional order of protection.

Lastly, according to FCA §842-a(3), when there has been a finding of a willful failure to obey an order of protection pursuant to FCA §846-a, the Family Court must revoke any licenses, order the Respondent ineligible for a license, and/or order the immediate surrender of any or all firearms owned or possessed where the willful failure involved:

• (i) the infliction of serious physical injury or
• (ii) the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument or
• (iii) behavior constituting any violent felony offense or
• (iv) behavior constituting stalking in the first, second, third or fourth degree.

Again, the Family Court may revoke any licenses, order the Respondent ineligible for a license, and/or order the immediate surrender of any or all firearms owned or possessed if it finds a substantial risk that the Respondent may use or threaten to use a firearm unlawfully against the family or household member protected by the current order of protection.

ii. Criminal Procedure Law Provisions Regarding Firearms and Orders of Protection

Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) §530.14 provides New York's criminal courts with similar guidelines regarding firearms. Similar to the Family Court Act provisions above, CPL §530.14 provides different guidelines depending on whether or not a temporary order of protection or final order of protection was issued or if the defendant has been found to have violated the order of protection.

According to CPL §530.14(1)(a) & (b), when a temporary order of protection is issued, the criminal court must suspend any existing license, order the Defendant ineligible for such a license and order the immediate surrender of firearms owned or possessed if the court receives information which gives it good cause to believe that :

• (i) the Defendant had a prior conviction of any violent felony offense or
• (ii) the Defendant had previously been found to have willfully failed to obey a prior order of protection and this failure involved (a) the infliction of serious physical injury, (b) the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon, or (c) behavior constituting any violent felony offense or
• (iii) if the Defendant has a prior conviction for stalking in the first, second, third or fourth degrees.

The criminal court may suspend any licenses, order the Defendant ineligible for a license, and/or order the immediate surrender of any or all firearms owned or possessed if it finds a substantial risk that the Defendant may use or threaten to use a firearm unlawfully against the person protected by the current temporary order of protection.

According to CPL 530.14(2)(a) & (b), when a final order of protection is issued, the criminal court must revoke any existing license, order the Defendant ineligible for such a license, and order the immediate surrender of any and all firearms owned or possessed where such action is required by Section 400.00 of the Penal Law. Section 400.00 prohibits anyone who has been convicted of a felony or serious offense from applying for a firearm license. Again, the criminal court may revoke any existing license, order the Defendant ineligible for such a license, and order the immediate surrender of any and all firearms owned or possessed if it finds a substantial risk that the Defendant may use or threaten to use a firearm unlawfully against the person protected by the current order of protection.

Lastly, according to CPL 530.14(3), when there has been a finding of a willful failure to obey an order of protection , the court must revoke any existing license, order the Defendant ineligible for such a license, and order the immediate surrender of any and all firearms owned or possessed where the willful failure to obey such order involved:

• (i) the infliction of serious physical injury
• (ii) the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument
• (iii) behavior constituting any violent felony offense or
• (iv) behavior constituting stalking in the first, second, third or fourth degrees.

Again, the criminal court may revoke any existing license, order the Defendant ineligible for such a license, and order the immediate surrender of any and all firearms owned or possessed if it finds a substantial risk that the Defendant may use or threaten to use a firearm unlawfully against the person protected by the current order of protection.

iii. Domestic Relations Law Provisions Regarding Firearms and Orders of Protection

As of September 20, 2000, the Domestic Relations Law (DRL) was amended to reflect the above discussed statutory guidelines pertaining to orders of protection and firearms. DRL §240(3) and §252 were amended to require that when issuing orders of protection, the Supreme Court must direct the suspension of or revocation of firearm licenses and/or ineligibility for such a license as well as the surrender of all firearms owned or possessed in accordance with the guidelines contained in FCA §842-a and CPL §530.14.

POINT 2

Although New York State laws provide courts with discretion on when to order the removal of firearms in order of protection proceedings, the federal laws addressing domestic violence and firearms provide no such discretion.

A. The Federal Laws Addressing Domestic Violence and Firearms

The federal laws addressing firearms were enacted as part of the 1996 amendments to the Gun Control Act of 1968. The laws are contained in 18 U.S.C. §922(d)(8), (d)(9), (g)(8) & (g)(9) and address the possession and transfer of firearms to individuals subject to court orders protecting their intimate partners and individuals convicted of qualifying misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence.

The federal definition of firearms is contained in 18 U.S.C.§ 921(3). Firearms are defined as: (a) any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive; (b) the frame or receiver of any such weapon; (c) any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or (d) any destructive device. This contrasts with New York's more limited definition of firearms discussed above. Under federal law, once an order of protection is issued after a hearing at which the person had notice of and an opportunity to participate, that person is prohibited from possessing almost every type of firearms; including ammunition.

The definition of intimate partner is found at 18 USC §921(a)(32) and includes the spouse of the person, a former spouse of the person, an individual who is a parent of a child of such person and an individual who cohabits or has cohabited with such person. This definition is broader than New York's limited definition of family and household member, which defines who is protected under Article 8 of the FCA and CPL §530.12. A family and household member includes individuals related by blood, those who have a child in common or those who are married or are formerly married (See FCA §812 and CPL §530.11). As such, the federal law pertaining to orders of protection will apply to both Family Court and criminal court orders of protection issued between family and household members as defined in New York as well as those issued between individuals currently living together or who have lived together in the past.

i. The Specific Federal Laws

According to 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8), it is unlawful for any person to possess a firearm who is subject to a court order that was issued:

• after a hearing of which such person received actual notice and had an opportunity to participate and
• the order restrains such person from harassing, stalking or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child AND
• the order includes a finding that the person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child OR by its terms the order explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury.

Applying the above to the standard order of protection issued in New York, any order of protection issued in a court proceeding in which the individual had notice and an opportunity to participate and the order of protection is a restrain from order that prohibits the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against an intimate partner or child is subject to this federal prohibition against the possession of firearms. Importantly, as consent orders are typically entered in Family and Supreme Court, whereby no finding of wrongdoing is entered but the individual consents to an order being entered against him, this provision is being interpreted as applying to such consent orders. (4) The argument is that as long as the individual had notice of the order and an "opportunity" to participate, he/she chose to consent to the order and as such the federal law will apply.

There is an official use exemption to the above provision, which is contained in 18 U.S.C. §925. It states that the above restriction does not apply to firearms issued to a law enforcement officer or military personnel as long as the officer is on duty. As each law enforcement agency may interpret on duty differently, it is important to check with each specific police department as to what their definition of on duty is.

According to 18 U.S.C. §922(d)(8), it is unlawful for any person to knowingly transfer a firearm to a person subject to an order of protection that restrains such person from harassing, stalking or threatening an intimate partner or the child of such intimate partner. It may be challenging to establish a violation of this section as the supplier must knowingly transfer the firearm. Again, there is an official use exemption to this provision, contained in 18 U.S.C. §925, which states that this restriction does not apply to any firearms issued to a law enforcement officer or military personnel as long as the officer is on duty.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) prohibits the possession of a firearm after a conviction of a qualifying misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. The qualifying misdemeanor crime of domestic violence must have as an element the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon and it must be committed by a current of former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent or guardian of the victim. In addition, due process requirements must be met. This is a retroactive statute and there is no official use exemption for this statute. Thus, any law enforcement officer or military personnel who has ever been convicted of a qualifying misdemeanor crime of domestic violence can not possess a firearm unless the conviction has been expunged or set aside.

Lastly, 18 U.S.C. §922(d)(9) prohibits the transfer of a firearm to a person convicted of a qualifying misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. Again, this transfer must be knowing and there is no official use exemption for this section.

The federal laws will be prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney's Office in the applicable District. It is important to establish a relationship with the relevant U.S. Attorney's Office so that they can be notified of any potential violations.

B. Constitutional Challenges to the Federal Domestic Violence Firearm Laws

Since their inception, there has been a substantial amount of litigation challenging the constitutionality of two of the above provisions - 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8) & (9). The main constitutional arguments set forth by defendants convicted of these two offenses are that Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause when it passed these laws and the statutes violate their due process rights. The overwhelming majority of courts have rejected the arguments and affirmed the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8) & (9).

The federal courts have overwhelmingly affirmed the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8) and (9) under the Commerce Clause. A recent case is illustrative of the courts' rulings on defendants' arguments under the Commerce Clause. In U.S. v. Visnich, 2000 WL 1141063 (N.D. Ohio), the Court denied the Defendant's motion to vacate his guilty plea and to reconsider his motion to dismiss the count of his indictment charging him with 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8) in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in U.S. v. Morrison (120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000)).(5)

In denying the Defendant's motion, the Court found that the jurisdictional element contained in 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8) that specifically prohibits individuals under a domestic relations restraining order from "shipping or transporting in interstate or foreign commerce, or possessing in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition or receiving any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce" satisfies the requirement under Morrison that a connection must exist between the regulated conduct and interstate commerce. Id at 2. Thus, based on this connection, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) and (9) pass constitutional muster under the Commerce Clause.

The due process argument has generated the most litigation. Defendants argue that 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8) & (9) violate their due process rights under the 5th Amendment since they did not have actual notice that the federal law prohibits the possession of firearms while subject to a state order of protection or that they can not possess a firearm after being convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. As the statute requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant knowingly violated 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8) and (9), defendant's argue that they did not know their conduct was in violation of this federal law.

The majority of courts have rejected this due process argument. U.S. v. Kafka, 2000 WL 1191056 (9th Cir. (Wash.)), U.S. v. Hutzell, 217 F.3d 966 (C.A. 8 (Iowa) 2000), U.S. v. Bunnell, 106 F.Supp.2d 60 (D. Maine, 2000), U.S. v. Reddick, 203 F.3d 767 (10th Cir. 2000), U.S. v. Beavers, 2000 WL 174861, (6th Cir. (Mich.), cert denied by Beavers v. U.S., 120 S.Ct.1989 (U.S.May 15, 2000), U.S. v. Mitchell, 2000 WL 309298, (4th Cir. (Va.) 2000), U.S. v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211 (6th Cir. 1999), cert denied by Baker v. U.S., 120 S.Ct. 1262, 146 L.Ed.2d 117 (2000), U.S. v. Lewitzke, 176 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir., (Wisc.) 1999), U.S. v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215 (1st Cir., 1999), U.S. v. Spruill, 61 F.Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Texas, 1999), U.S. v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280 (7th Cir. 1998), cert denied, 527 U.S. 1024, 119 S.Ct. 2371, 144 L.Ed.2d 774 (1999).

In rejecting the argument that 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8) and (9) violate due process, the courts have looked to Supreme Court precedent interpreting the knowledge requirement of a statute. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193, 118 S. Ct. 1939. Based on Bryan, in which the Court found that the knowledge requirement applies only to the act of possession and not to the prohibition on possession, the prosecution need only prove that the defendant had knowledge regarding the facts of the offense and not that the defendant knew that his conduct was illegal.

Further, the courts have adhered to the old legal maxim "ignorance of the law is no excuse" and refused to find 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8) & (9) as falling within the narrow exception to this maxim carved out in Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225,228, 78 S.Ct. 240 (1957). In Lambert, the Supreme Court found unconstitutional a Los Angeles Municipal Code provision which made it unlawful for any person convicted of a felony in California to be or remain in Los Angeles for a period of more than five days without registering with the Chief of Police. Id at 226. The Court recognized a narrow exception to this deep rooted legal maxim but only if two prerequisites are met: the conduct of the person who runs afoul of the law must be "wholly passive" and there must be an "absence of circumstances that would alert the person to the consequences of his deed." Id at 228.

In finding that 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8) and (9) do not fall within the above Lambert exception, the courts have emphasized the difference between the statute in Lambert and 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8) and (9). Lambert applies to conduct that is wholly passive whereby there is no reason the individual should suspect that he/she may be in violation of the law. Although the courts agree that the possession of firearms seems to be innocent conduct, the mere fact that an order of protection has been issued against a person is enough to place that person on notice that his/her conduct may be entitled to increased government regulation. See U.S. v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1999) (upholding 18 U.S.C §922(g)(8) against due process challenge stating "The fact that Baker had been made subject to a domestic violence protection order provided him with notice that his conduct was subject to increased government scrutiny. Because it is not reasonable for someone in his position to expect to possess dangerous weapons free from extensive regulation."), U.S. v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 225-226 (1st Cir. 1999) (upholding 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8) against due process challenge because an individual subject to protective order "would not be sanguine about the legal consequences of possessing a firearm"), U.S. v. Bostic, 168 F.3d 718, 722 (4th Cir. 1999) (upholding 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8) against due process challenge stating that "like a felon, a person subject to a protective order cannot reasonably expect to be free from regulation when possessing a firearm").

Only two lower level District Courts have reversed defendants' convictions under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8) and (9) as violating defendants' due process rights. U.S. v. Emerson, 46 F.Supp.2d 598 (N.D. Texas, 1999), U.S. v. Ficke, 58 F.Supp.2d 1071 (D. Neb. 1998). There have been strong dissents in two of the decisions that rejected the defendants' due process arguments. See U.S. v. Wilson, Supra at 293 -296 and U.S. v. Hutzell, Supra at 969 - 983. The dissents have emphasized the obscurity of the federal laws addressing domestic violence and the lack of notice and publication of the law. As such, the dissents have held that the laws should fall within the exception carved out by the Supreme Court in Lambert. Supra.

Even in light of the two lower court decisions and the strong dissents issued in these cases, the most recent Court of Appeals decisions issued continue to uphold the constitutionalityof 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8) and (9). All circuit courts that have ruled on this issue have upheld the statutes' constitutionality and certiorari continues to be denied in such cases. Thus, it is unlikely that the defendants' constitutional challenges will be successful.

POINT 3

If Certain Procedural Requirements are Met, Federal Law will Apply to all Orders of Protection Issued in New York State Courts Except Ex Parte Orders.

After examining the federal and state laws addressing domestic violence and firearms, it is clear there are distinct difference between the laws that may generate confusion for advocates.

As discussed above, two important differences between the laws are the different definitions of firearms and the different individuals protected under the state and federal laws - family and household members vs. intimate partners. Again, New York law defines firearms more narrowly than federal law but under the state statutes discussed above, the New York courts can still order firearms to be surrendered that go beyond this narrow definition. With regard to the differences in who is protected under the state and federal laws, one must remember that §18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8) applies to individuals subject to an order of protection that protects their intimate partner. In addition to the individuals covered by New York's definition of family and household member, an intimate partner also includes individuals cohabiting together or individuals that have cohabited together in the past.

The most critical difference between the two laws is that the state laws provide discretion to courts regarding firearms. In stark contrast to this, the federal laws provide no discretion regarding an individual's ability to possess a firearm if an order of protection has been issued after a hearing at which the person had notice of and an opportunity to participate. As long as the requisite procedural requirements have been met, that individual is prohibited from possessing firearms. Consent orders are interpreted as covered under the federal law as long as the individual had notice of the hearing and an opportunity to participate. The argument is that the individual had an opportunity to participate and chose to consent to the order. The only orders of protection not covered under the federal laws will be ex parte orders issued in temporary order of protection proceedings or orders issued before the individual has had an opportunity to participate in the proceeding. This is an important distinction because in proceedings involving ex parte orders of protection, only the state laws addressing firearms will apply.

Most importantly, even if the state court does not order the removal of firearms during a proceeding involving an order of protection, the federal law will still prohibit individuals from possessing firearms as long as the order was issued after a hearing at which the person had notice and an opportunity to participate. Thus, if an individual who is subject to an order of protection meeting the requisite procedural requirements, is stopped by a law enforcement officer or arrested for any reason and firearms are found, that individual is likely to be arrested for a violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8). Because of this, it is contradictory that New York laws still allow judges to exercise discretion in proceedings involving orders of protection since under federal law, no such discretion is granted.

In discussions with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of New York, they recommend that to remedy this confusion between the state and federal laws, all individuals should be verbally informed of the federal laws prohibiting him/her from possessing a firearm when the order of protection is issued or the order of protection should contain a provision informing the respondent and/or defendant about the federal laws. Even though the case law regarding the due process challenges to the federal laws does not require this notice, this notice may reduce the possibility of confusion.

CONCLUSION

Since the passage of the Family Protection and Domestic Violence Intervention Act in 1994, New York has drastically reformed its laws addressing domestic violence; recognizing that domestic violence is a criminal act and individuals need to be held accountable for their actions. With regard to firearms, New York enacted specific guidelines for courts to follow when issuing orders of protection. Unfortunately, as New York laws provide courts with some discretion regarding when to order the surrender of firearms during order of protection proceedings, this contradicts with the federal law that prohibits the possession of firearms when an individual is subject to an order of protection issued after a hearing at which the person had notice of and an opportunity to participate. Constitutional challenges regarding these federal laws have not been successful. Thus, in order to be compliant with federal law, New York statutes should be amended to mandate that courts order the surrender of firearms once an order of protection is issued after a hearing at which the person had notice of an opportunity to participate.

1. Commission on Domestic Violence Fatalities , Report to the Governor, October 1997.

2. Brock, K. When Men Murder Women: An Analysis of 1997 Homicide Data: Females Murdered by Males in Single Victim/Single Offender Incidents. Washington, D.C.: Violence Policy Center, 1999.

3. See Penal Law Section 120.45 - 120.60 for the definition of each degree of stalking.

4. Phone Conversation with Kathleen Mehltreter, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S.Attorney's Office, Western District of New York, 4/26/00.

5. Supreme Court held the civil rights remedy contained in the Violence Against Women Act was unconstitutional as Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause.