Case Law on Federal Domestic Violence Crimes

January 1, 2000

Jennifer DeCarli

Case Law Addressing the Specific Elements of Interstate Domestic Violence 18 U.S.C. 2261(a)(2)

1.    U.S. v. Page, 167 F.3d 325, (C.A. 6 (Ohio) 1999) cert denied, Page v. U.S., 120 S. Ct.496 (US 11/15/99) (No. 99-97)
2.    U.S. v. Helem, 186 F.3d 449 (C.A. 4 (N.C.) 1999)

Case Law Addressing the Constitutionality of the Criminal Offense Statutes Under the VAWA

1.  U.S. v. Bailey, 112 F.3d 758, (C.A. 4 (W. Va.) 1997)
2.  U.S. v. Gluzman, 953 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
3.  U.S. v. Lankford III, 196 F.3d 563, (C.A. 5 (Tex.) 1999)
4.  U.S. v. Ruggles, 2000 WL 221970 (6th Cir. (Ky))

Case Law Addressing the Specific Elements of Interstate Domestic Violence - 18 U.S.C. 2261(a)(2)

1. U.S. v. Page - 167 F.3d 325, (C.A. 6 (Ohio) 1999) cert denied, Page v. U.S., 120 S.Ct. 496 (U.S. Nov 15, 1999) (No. 99 - 97) -

On a rehearing en banc, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of the defendant under 18 U.S.C. S 2261 (a)(2), interstate domestic violence, by an equally divided court. Defendant had prohibited the victim from leaving his condominium by using mace. Over the course of a few hours, he beat the victim with a claw hammer, pipe wrench and his fists. He then forced her into his car and drove through West Virginia and into Pennsylvania, with the purpose of evading state prosecution. Four hours later, he delivered the victim to an emergency room in Pennsylvania. During the travel, the defendant did not physically touch the victim. However, he did threaten to push her out of the car and the victim's pre-existing injuries were aggravated due to the forced travel and the defendant prohibiting her from seeking immediate medical treatment.

The issue was whether the statute was intended to cover an attack preceding the interstate travel. This was an issue of first impression. The court held that the statute does reach situations where the beating of an intimate partner occurs prior to travel as long as it is integrally related to the subsequent forced travel across state lines. In addition, the court ruled that in this particular case, the aggravation of the victim's injuries as well as the threats to push her out of the car that occurred during the travel were further injuries caused during the travel. The dissent argued that the plain reading of the statute should only apply to injuries sustained during or as a result of such forced travel.

2. U.S. v. Helem , 186 F.3d 449 (C.A.4 (N.C.) 1999)

Defendant was convicted of interstate domestic violence. Defendant prevented his estranged wife from leaving his apartment by choking her. While continuing to choke her, he made threatening remarks regarding death while striking her in the face numerous times. The victim lost consciousness. After regaining consciousness, the defendant released the victim and apologized. Defendant forced the victim to leave the apartment and he drove the victim south, refusing to stop at hospitals along the way although his wife was in considerable pain. Eventually, the defendant took his wife to a hospital after she started coughing up blood, whereby she was finally able to communicate to the physician's assistant what had happened to her. The victim suffered multiple bruises, two black eyes, fractured cheekbones, bruises on her neck, and numerous cuts and scratches.

Again, the issue was whether or not the "in the course or as a result of that conduct" requirement of interstate domestic violence, 18 U.S.C. 2261(a)(2), was satisfied. The 4th Circuit agreed with the court's ruling in Page by holding that physical violence occurring before interstate travel begins can satisfy the "in the course or as a result of that conduct" requirement of 18 U.S.C. 2261(a)(2).

Case Law Addressing the Constitutionality of the Criminal Offense Statutes Under the VAWA

1. U.S. v. Bailey - 112 F.3d 758, (C.A.4 (W.Va.) 1997)

Defendant was convicted of kidnapping and interstate domestic violence. Defendant inflicted a head injury on his wife in their home and then drove in out and out of the state, with his wife either in the trunk of his car or in their backseat, for a period of five days before taking her to a hospital in Kentucky for medical assistance. The defendant's wife suffered permanent injuries and massive impairment to her total body functioning. She will most likely never walk again but may eventually learn to feed herself and talk. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment, a concurrent 20 year sentence, five year term of supervised release and $40,000 in restitution.

The Court upheld the defendant's conviction. More specifically, the Court held that Section 2261(a) of the VAWA did not violate the Commerce Clause since it requires the crossing of a state line, which place the transaction "squarely in interstate commerce". In addition, the Court held that the kidnapping charge and the interstate domestic violence charge were not multiplicatus since they both require proof of an element that the other does not.

2. U.S. v. Gluzman, 953 F.Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)

This case was brought against a woman for conspiring to commit the murder of her estranged husband. The defendant was convicted of conspiring to commit interstate domestic violence and for committing interstate domestic violence. Defendant conspired to and actually did travel from New Jersey to New York with the intent to murder her estranged husband, and once in New York, she did murder him with the assistance of a friend.

The Court reviewed the legislative history of Section 2261 in order to decide on the defendant's argument that Congress exceeded its authority to legislate under the Commerce Clause when it enacted Section 2261. The defendant argued that interstate travel in furtherance of spousal abuse is not an activity affecting interstate commerce and Section 2261 does not regulate a commercial activity or contain a requirement that the activity be connected to interstate commerce.

The Court held that Congress had a rational basis for concluding that the regulation of interstate domestic violence was "reasonably adapted to an end permitted by the Constitution". Furthermore, the Court concluded that the statute does have an identifiable interstate nexus, because it regulates conduct in interstate commerce, not conduct affecting interstate commerce since it requires the actual crossing of a state line with the intent to commit domestic violence and the actual commission of that violence.

3. U.S. v. Lankford III., 196 F.3d 563, (C.A. 5 (Tex.) 1999)

Defendant appealed from his conviction by a jury of kidnapping, interstate domestic violence, and using a firearm during and in relation to the commission of those crimes. The defendant forced his estranged wife into a car, by threatening to kill her and then himself with a gun that was visible to his estranged wife. The defendant handcuffed his wife's wrist to the gear shift and continuously warned her not to seek assistance from anyone. The defendant drove his estranged wife from Kansas to Oklahoma, forced his estranged wife to spend the night in Oklahoma with him and he forced her to have sex with him repeatedly. Although the victim was not handcuffed for the entire trip, she never attempted to cry out for help or flee due to the defendant's continuous threats to hurt her and himself if she did so.

The Court affirmed the lower court's decision and rejected the numerous arguments raised by the defendant. As for the defendant's specific challenge to the interstate domestic violence charge, the defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he crossed a state line with intent to injure, harass or intimidate his spouse. In addition, he argued that the interstate domestic violence section of the VAWA was unconstitutional. The court held that the jury chose to give more credibility to the victim's testimony than the defendants and that her testimony did not assert facts that she could not have observed nor events that could not have occurred. In addition, the court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the government's case that the defendant crossed state lines with the intent to harass, injure or intimidate his wife and that during the course of or as a result of such travel, he did intentionally commit a crime of violence and caused his wife bodily injury. Lastly, the court held that the interstate domestic violence section of the VAWA did not violate the Commerce Clause.

4. U.S. v. Ruggles, 2000 WL 221970 (6th Cir.(Ky))

Defendant was convicted by a jury of interstate domestic violence, two counts of interstate stalking, and interstate violation of a protective order. The facts supporting the charges occurred throughout a four month time period (April 1997 - July 1997) and ranged from traveling across state lines to threaten the victim and various relatives of the victim, using fraud to force the victim to drive across state lines to an acquaintance's home where he then forced her to engage in sexual activities with the acquaintance, traveling across state lines in order to ransack the victim's home and leave a knife in her door and contacting and confronting the victim in clear violation of a protective order.

The Court upheld the defendant's conviction on all charges finding that the Government presented sufficient evidence to establish all elements of the above charges and a rational juror could have found that the defendant committed the essential elements of the crimes charged.